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Cleaning Up after the Log Drivers’ Waltz : 
Finding the Ottawa River Watershed
Jamie BenidiCkson*
The Ottawa River has experienced the environmental impact of a 
succession of industrial uses from the lumber trade through hydroelec-
tric power development to pulp and paper manufacturing. Each of these 
activities, and the introduction of substantial discharges of urban waste-
water, has been the subject of legal intervention and regulatory controls. 
The present paper surveys this largely sectoral approach to water quality 
protection along the Ottawa River and notes in conclusion tentative steps 
being taken to formulate a more comprehensive and coherent framework 
on a watershed basis.
Qu’il s’agisse du commerce du bois, de l’hydroélectricité ou des 
manufactures de pâtes et papiers, les activités industrielles menées sur 
la rivière des Outaouais ont toutes eu des impacts environnementaux. 
Chacune de ces activités, de même que le rejet des eaux usées dans la 
rivière, a fait l’objet de contrôles juridiques et réglementaires. Dans cet 
article, l’auteur analyse l’approche sectorielle ayant prévalu en matière 
de protection de la qualité de l’eau et il note, en conclusion, certaines 
tentatives récentes visant à instaurer un cadre global et cohérent, qui 
tiendrait compte des bassins versants.
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Although lawyers must acknowledge sophisticated debate concerning 
the nature of ecosystems and watersheds1, we may observe that important 
contemporary efforts to safeguard or restore major water systems are 
broadly oriented towards the challenge of incorporating sound ecological 
principles within institutional frameworks corresponding to watershed 
communities2. The failure to “think like a watershed” — a challenge that 
is corollary to Aldo Leopold’s celebrated injunction that humanity should 
“think like a mountain” — comes at a high price3.
 1. James M. oMernik and Robert G. Bailey, “Distinguishing between Watersheds and 
Ecoregions”, Journal of the American Water Resources Association, vol. 33, No. 5, 
October 1997, p. 935.
 2. For background discussion, see polis proJeCt on eColoGiCal GovernanCe, At a 
Watershed. Ecological Governance and Sustainable Water Management in Canada, by 
Oliver M. Brandes and others, Urban Water Demand Management Program, Victoria, 
University of Victoria, May 2005, [Online], [www.polisproject.org/PDFs/AtaWatershed.
pdf] (11 June 2010).
 3. Disturbing discussion of current and anticipated developments is widespread. See for 
example : world water assessMent proGraMMe, The United Nations World Water 
Development Report 3. Water in a Changing World, Paris, UNESCO, 2009, [Online], 
[www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr3/tableofcontents.shtml] (12 June 2010) ; Ken 
ConCa, Governing Water. Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution 
Building, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2006, chap. 3 “Pushing Rivers Around : the Cumulative 
Toll on the World’s Watersheds and Freshwater Ecosystems”, p. 73 ff. ; Peter H. 
GleiCk, “China and Water”, in P.H. GleiCk and others (eds.), The World’s Water 2008-
2009. The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources, Washington, Island Press, 2009, 
chap. 5, p. 79 ff., [Online], [www.worldwater.org/data20082009/ch05.pdf] (17 June 2010) ; 
Jacques leslie, Deep Water. The Epic Struggle over Dams, Displaced People, and the 
Environment, New York, Picador, 2005 ; Robert W. sandFord, Restoring the Flow. 
Confronting the World’s Water Woes, Surrey, Rocky Mountain Books, 2009.
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The nature of watershed thinking — simultaneously social, legal and 
scientific — has been extensively discussed4. It calls for an integrated appre-
ciation of watersheds in conjunction with human communities in contrast 
to the generally fragmented understanding that has emerged from historic 
decisions reflecting sectoral and generational preferences.
The present condition of the Ottawa River is the cumulative result 
of commercial, industrial and technological intervention on a waterway 
that was reduced to less than the sum of its parts by local, provincial and 
national decisions that echo the social, legal and scientific assumptions of 
their age. With reference to legislative and institutional measures intermit-
tently advanced to facilitate preferred uses or to forestall deterioration, this 
essay briefly surveys the transformation of the Ottawa River from its pre-
industrial state5. Earlier opportunities to implement more comprehensive 
approaches have been missed, but several recent initiatives, more water-
shed oriented in nature, have begun to emerge in the Ottawa River context.
From its origins in the Laurentian mountains of Québec, the Ottawa 
River flows westwards to Lake Temiskaming, before turning southeast-
wards towards the national capital region en route to the St. Lawrence at 
Montréal. With a total length of over 1200 kms, the Ottawa — together with 
such important tributaries as the Coulonge, Dumoine, Gatineau,  Madawaska, 
Mattawa and Rideau Rivers — drains a basin of nearly 150,000 km2.
 4. One example is associated with “integrated water resources management”. As explained 
in Agenda 21, “[i]ntegrated water resources management is based on the perception of 
water as an integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource and a social and economic 
good, whose quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilization […] In developing 
and using water resources, priority has to be given to the satisfaction of basic needs 
and the safeguarding of ecosystems.” Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (vol. I) (3-14 June 
1992), Annex II “Agenda 21”, ¶ 18.8. For some indication of the legal implications of 
the watershed approach, see : Robert W. adler and Michele strauBe, “Watersheds 
and the Integration of U.S. Water Law and Policy : Bridging the Great Divides”, (2000-
2001) 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1 ; Jon Cannon, “Choices and Institutions 
in Watershed Management”, (2000-2001) 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 379 ; 
A. Dan tarloCk, “Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape : The Revival of Watershed 
Management in the United States”, (1999-2000) 6 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 
167.
 5. For a broadly comparable U.S. study, see Joel A. tarr, “Land Use and Environmental 
Change in the Hudson-Raritan Estuary Region, 1700-1980”, in J.A.tarr (ed.), The Search 
for the Ultimate Sink. Urban Pollution in Historical Perspective, Akron, University of 
Akron Press, 1996, p. 36.
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1 The Early Alterations
Aboriginal and fur trade use of the Ottawa involved minimal impact 
on stream flow and water quality. Indeed, aspects of the pre-industrial 
landscape, including beaver dams, would today be understood as  ecological 
services that contribute positively — through filtration — to the river’s 
health6. Yet soon after Philemon Wright ran his first square timber raft 
downstream to transport white pine to the British export market in 1806, 
transformative changes began.
Timber trade alterations or “improvements” to the Ottawa’s flow 
included canals such as those opened in the 1830s alongside the Carillon 
Rapids, Chute à Blondeau and Long Sault and diversion dams such as the 
Chaudière to power grist and saw mills following the arrival of the water-
turbine in the 1840s. Introduced by Ruggles Wright in 1829, the timber 
slide vastly extended the timber trade to the upper Ottawa valley justi-
fying substantial investments in forest exploitation7. Such chutes facili-
tated timber drives at Chats Falls (1835), Portage du Fort (1839), Calumet 
Falls (1843) and Rapides des Joachims (1844), among other locations8. 
Direct impacts on flows were positively assessed from the perspective of 
economic return.
Mid-nineteenth century observers also viewed water quality favour-
ably. Thus, in 1854, T.C. Keefer, a consulting engineer, compared the 
Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers as sources of drinking water supply for 
his Montréal clients. Both waters, he began, “may be drank with impunity 
by persons who are immediately and severely affected by the water now 
supplied to this city”. But the “softer,” though sherry-coloured, Ottawa was 
“the most valuable for public use”. Reports that shad and salmon were less 
 6. Evelyn C. pielou, Fresh Water, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998, chap. 10 
“Wetlands”, p. 214 ff. ; Alice outwater, Water. A Natural History, New York, Basic 
Books, 1996, chap. 2 “Nature’s Hydrologists”, p. 19 ff.
 7. For discussion of the timber drive, see : parks Canada, The Timber Trade in the Ottawa 
Valley, 1806-54, by Sandra J. Gillis, Report No. 153, Ottawa, National Historic Parks 
and Sites Branch, 1975, p. 155-175. For a detailed discussion of “improvements”, see id., 
p. 255-299.
 8. ontario Ministry oF natural resourCes, Review of the Historical and Existing 
Natural Environment and Resource Uses on the Ottawa River, by Tim Haxton and 
Don CHuBBuCk, Technical Report No. 119, Science and Information Resources Division, 
Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 2002, p. 6, [Online], [ottawariverkeeper.ca/files/tim_haxton_
report.pdf] (18 June 2010).
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inclined to ascend the St. Lawrence also constituted “an argument in favour 
of the superior purity of the Ottawa9”.
However, the waters of the Ottawa were already experiencing the 
impacts of stream modification, direct discharges from numerous sources, 
and land use impacts.
2 The Sawdust Menace and Forest Industry Operations
Mill refuse, including sawdust, bark and slabs, interfered with nine-
teenth-century stream flow and navigation. As Richard Cartwright, MP, 
graphically explained, manufacturers near the nation’s capital annually 
produced roughly 10,000,000 cubic feet of lumber. This level of industrial 
activity resulted in 2,000,000 cubic feet of rubbish. Generally dispatched 
directly to the river, the lumber mill waste was “sufficient to block up the 
river for four miles, to a width of 200 feet, and a depth of one foot10”. Severe 
accumulations along the Ottawa following Confederation in 1867 inspired 
federal legislation to prohibit lumber mills from disposing of such wastes 
in navigable streams or rivers.
Legislation intended to prohibit the discharge of mill waste provoked 
Ottawa lumbermen to protest. They cited devastating economic impacts 
and argued that annual spring freshets eliminated adverse effects on naviga-
tion11. To investigate the controversy, federally-appointed commissioners 
gathered evidence. Dr. E. Van Cortland, the city of Ottawa’s health officer, 
criticized the threefold impact of lumber mill refuse on spawning grounds, 
on navigation and on public health. Notwithstanding limitations in the 
scientific foundations on which it rested, this was a rare early attempt to 
consolidate a range of community concerns over industrial interference 
 9. Thomas C. keeFer, Report on a Preliminary Survey for the Water Supply of the City 
of Montréal, Montréal, John Lovell, 1854, Appendix quoted in Toronto Board of Works, 
Report of the Board of Works with Report of the City Engineer on City Sewerage 
(Toronto, 1857) p. 84-85. Later assessments considered the colour of the Ottawa River 
water more problematic. See Canada, Bureau oF Mines, Industrial Waters of Canada : 
Report on Investigations, 1934 to 1940, by Harald A. leverin, Ottawa, Department of 
Mines and Resources, Mines and Geology Branch, 1942, p. 48 and 49.
10. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 4th sess., 1st Parl., 28 February 1871, “Protection 
of Navigable Waters”, p. 73 (Richard Cartwright).
11. Pollution by the Ottawa lumber industry eventually became a classic illustration of the 
enforcement challenges facing environmental regulators. See Canada, departMent oF 
JustiCe, From Sawdust to Toxic Blobs. A Consideration of Sanctioning Strategies to 
Combat Pollution in Canada, by Duncan CHappell, Ottawa, Minister of Supply and 
Services Canada, 1988. On the forest industry generally, see Chad GaFField, “The 
Golden Age of the Forest Economy”, in C. GaFField (ed.), History of the Outaouais, 
Sainte-Foy, Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1997, chap. 6, p. 153 ff.
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with water quality. But mill owners threatened loss of employment if they 
were forced to abandon water-power technology in favour of steam and 
presented engineering studies to debunk their critics12.
Simple observation discredited saccharine theory. Travelling from 
Lachine up past the Grenville Rapids and Hawkesbury to the capital, the 
commissioners encountered numerous waste deposits, some extending 
“wholly across the river13”. At the lock beneath Colonel By’s Rideau Canal, 
logs, square timber and other debris thoroughly blocked up the bay14.
Passed in 1873, the federal statute prohibited the discharge of mill 
waste, including sawdust, into navigable waterways15. But J.R. Booth, 
whose vast commercial ventures in the white pine trade would eventually 
earn him recognition as a “lumber king,” refused to bring his Chaudière mill 
into compliance. He preferred instead to pay a twenty dollar penalty when, 
in 1875, he became the first subject of enforcement action16. Facing possible 
further prosecutions, and perhaps ultimately injunction proceedings almost 
all of the Ottawa Valley mill owners completed renovations (not always 
including the removal of sawdust and grindings) by the end of the decade 
and obtained exemptions from the act by order in council 23 June 188017.
Exemptions had been explicitly anticipated by the legislation although 
the onus lay on the lumbermen to satisfy the Governor-in-Council that 
the “public interest would not be injuriously affected18”. These arrange-
ments for subordinating a collective environmental interest to industrial 
convenience embodied the type of shortcomings in environmental protec-
tion legislation that continue to attract severe criticism today : a limited 
conception of the public interest, broad administrative discretion, and the 
absence of effective mechanisms to facilitate community participation in 
decision-making.
12. Canada, parliaMent, “Report on the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the 
Condition of Navigable Streams”, by Hamilton H. killaly, Sessional Papers, 1st sess., 
2nd Parl., vol. 6, No. 29, 1873, p. 8 [hereinafter “Killaly Report”].
13. Id., p. 14.
14. Id., p. 12.
15. An Act for the Better Protection of Navigable Streams and Rivers, S.C. 1873, c. 65, s. 1.
16. John P.S. MClaren, “The Tribulations of Antoine Ratté : A Case Study of the 
Environmental Regulation of the Canadian Lumbering Industry in the Nineteenth 
Century”, (1984) 33 U.N.B.L.J. 203, 221.
17. Id. and R. Peter Gillis, “Rivers of Sawdust : The Battle over Industrial Pollution in 
Canada, 1865-1903”, Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 1986, p. 84, at 
pages 90 and 91.
18. An Act for the Better Protection of Navigable Streams and Rivers, supra, note 15, s. 4.
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Exempt from prosecution under the federal statute, the lumbermen 
were by no means immunized from private litigation. Indeed, one judge 
described them as “wrongdoers, who from their mills allow sawdust, 
blocks, chips, bark, and other refuse to fall into the River Ottawa19”. Not 
only was water fouled and rendered offensive to taste and smell, but gas 
generated under water produced “frequent explosions which are disagree-
able and sometimes dangerous20”.
Lumber waste was equally a concern at the provincial level. Thus, 
in the early 1880s, Ontario public health officials solicited information 
from municipal authorities about adverse health impacts associated with 
sawdust disposal. Local officials were also asked to describe measures 
undertaken by fishery inspectors to prevent pollution and to report on any 
indications of compliance21. 
In time, the Ontario Provincial Board of Health would exert an 
extraordinary influence over matters such as these. In their first encounter 
with the Ottawa Valley lumber trade, however, public health officials were 
out-manœuvred. Threatened with possible court orders against their opera-
tions, mill owners sought legislative protection. In 1885, in an arrangement 
reminiscent of the earlier federal exemption, Premier Mowat’s provincial 
government immunized operators of saw mills who threw sawdust and 
refuse into the Ottawa River from actions for injunctions when the Lieu-
tenant Governor determined that the public interest so required. In an 
action for an injunction against the owner or occupier of an Ottawa River 
mill site, arising from dumped sawdust or other mill waste, the courts were 
instructed to “take into consideration the importance of the lumber trade 
to the locality wherein such injury, damage or interference takes place, 
and the benefit and advantage, direct and consequential, which such trade 
confers on the locality and on the inhabitants thereof, and shall weigh the 
same against the private injury, damage or interference complained of”. 
Ontario legislators clearly wished to deter the courts from impeding a major 
and productive resource industry22. This striking statutory intervention 
19. Booth v. Ratté (1890), 15 App. Cas. 188, 190 (P.C.) ; (1887) 14 O.A.R. 419 (C.A.) ; (1886) 
11 O.R. 491 (H.C.J. Ch.D.) ; (1885) 10 O.R. 351 (H.C.J. Ch.D.).
20. “Farmer Drowned”, The Ottawa Citizen, 12 November 1897.
21. ontario, provinCial Board oF HealtH, Sawdust Survey from the Provincial Board 
of Health to Municipalities, by Peter H. BryCe, Scrapbooks, Item 32, RG62, Series B4, 
Ottawa, Archives of Ontario, 1884.
22. An Act Respecting Saw Mills on the Ottawa River, S.O. 1885, c. 24, s. 1 (1) ; The Globe, 
24 March 1885, p. 5 ; reference to federal concern with lumber refuse as an interference 
with navigation may be found in parks Canada, The Rideau Canal. Defence, Transport 
and Recreation, by Judith tulloCH, National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Ottawa, 
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1981, p. 25.
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using a crude version of cost-benefit analysis that was restricted to private 
considerations privileged the status of the Ottawa River as an industrial 
corridor over preservation of its natural state and functions.
Despite provincial legislation to discourage injunctions against lumber 
mills, the controversy, including its Ottawa River dimensions, persisted 
at the national level, as the harmful effects of sawdust on marine and 
aquatic life became more fully appreciated. In 1889 a federal Fisheries 
official explained that floatability allowed the “blasting influences” of the 
sawdust scourge to spread downstream, even in some instances to vulner-
able estuaries, small inlets and bays. Here it “kills the sources which give 
life and food for the smaller races of insects and other marine animals”, 
and as it settled, “forms a compact mass of pollution all along the bottoms 
and margins of the rivers and inlets, filling up the crevices on the gravel 
beds, and among stones, where aquatic life is invariably produced and 
fed”. Sawdust, described as “a fixed, imperishable foreign matter”, even-
tually produced “a long, continuous mantle of death23”. These cumulative 
consequences, in all but name, were ecological. Yet it remained to be seen 
how concerns of this nature might be addressed within the established 
legal framework.
Ottawa’s constitutional responsibility for navigation appeared in the 
late nineteenth century somewhat more robust than its ostensible authority 
in relation to fisheries, and so, in 1886, the sawmill provision was rewritten 
with reference to the firmer constitutional foundations : “No owner or 
tenant of any saw-mill, or any workman therein or other person shall throw 
or cause to be thrown, or suffer or permit to be thrown, any sawdust, 
edgings, slabs, bark or rubbish of any description whatsoever, into any 
river, stream or other water any part of which is navigable, or which flows 
into any navigable water24.”
With a flourish, that final phrase — flows into any navigable 
water — asserted the sweeping extent of federal concern. However, the 
possibility of exemptions had been preserved.
23. Canada, parliaMent, “Annual Report of the Department of Fisheries, Dominion of 
Canada, for the Calendar Year 1889”, Sessional Papers, 4th sess., 6th Parl., vol. 12, 
No. 17, 1890, p. 17, quoted in Gilbert allardyCe, “‘The Vexed Question of Sawdust’ : 
River Pollution in Nineteenth Century New Brunswick”, The Dalhousie Review, vol. 52, 
No. 2, Summer 1972, p. 177, at page 178, reproduced in Chad GaFField and pam 
GaFField (eds.), Consuming Canada : Readings in Environnemental History, Toronto, 
Copp Clark, 1995, p. 120.
24. An Act Respecting the Protection of Navigable Waters, S.C. 1886, c. 36, s. 7.
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There was little evidence of support for vigorous enforcement against 
the lumber mills from higher reaches of government. Even Prime Minister 
John A. Macdonald, oblivious to any inter-relationship between forest 
health, water quality and fish habitat, remarked that forestry and the fishery 
should each take their turn : when all the trees were cut along the river, it 
could then be restocked with fish25. It was not until 1894 that legislation to 
eliminate discretionary exemptions was finally approved by Parliament26.
The announcement that exemptions would expire in May 1895 was 
certainly not welcomed by the trade. As Hiram Robinson of the Hawkesbury 
Lumber Company explained, his extensive mills, located on the Longue 
Sault rapids about sixty miles below Ottawa, employed eight hundred men. 
It was practically impossible to save sawdust and smaller refuse, Robinson 
insisted, owing to the very low head of fall and some back water, during the 
running season, as a result of which “the wheels and machinery are very 
much submerged27”. Robinson estimated the cost of replacing the installed 
works with steam powered facilities at between 375,000 and 425,000 dollars, 
not including the loss of the value of the current mills and the costs associ-
ated with shutting down for the construction. To ground a jurisdictional 
challenge, Robinson explained that since his mill was located alongside a 
long rapid, no steamers or barges utilized the channel. Consequently, “no 
damage has been done to Navigation or to settlers, or people in any way28”. 
This was a highly localized vision of the Ottawa and one that viewed the 
water power as an essentially private utility.
In 1899 prosecutions were finally launched to encourage compliance, 
but over a three year period J.R. Booth secured further indulgences, osten-
sibly to complete conversion of his lumber mill into a pulp plant utilizing 
sawdust as fuel. On September 11, 1901 the prosecutorial arm of the depart-
ment of justice finally obtained a conviction and another twenty dollar 
fine. Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier was then instrumental in securing 
Booth’s firm commitment to cease dumping sawdust after the 1902 season 
in exchange for relief from further prosecutions and the threat of  injunction 
proceedings29.
25. R. Gillis, supra, note 17, at page 94.
26. J.P.S. MClaren, supra, note 16, 233, at footnote 148 ; R. Gillis, supra, note 17, at pages 
93-95.
27. Letter from Hiram roBinson, Managing Director, to Sir Charles Tupper, 10 August 1894, 
Hawkesbury Lumber Company Papers, Archives of Ontario.
28. Letter from Hiram roBinson, Managing Director, to J.R. Booth, 18 September 1901, 
Hawkesbury Lumber Company Papers, Archives of Ontario.
29. R. Gillis, supra, note 17, at page 100.
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2.1 Pulp and Paper
Booth was not alone in anticipating the Ottawa forest industry’s shift 
from lumber to pulp and paper production consuming spruce rather than 
the declining supplies of pine. The opening of E.B. Eddy’s mechanical pulp 
mill in Hull in 1886 ushered in a new era in water quality, for residues from 
the chemical pulping process introduced in 1889 and paper making begun 
in 1890, as well as suspended wood fibres imposed severe demands on 
the river30. The early twentieth century witnessed dramatic expansion in 
the sector, particularly following the arrival of the Canadian International 
Paper Company in 192531.
The pulp and paper industry was indeed a source of controversy, but 
public attention focussed largely on the terms of pulpwood concessions and 
associated hydroelectric power facilities during the first half of the twen-
tieth century32. To the extent that industrial river pollution was of concern 
to Ontario government officials during the interwar years, efforts were 
made to resolve conflicts informally, or to downplay environmental impacts 
in comparison with the benefits of resource extraction and employment33. 
When the environmental consequences of pulp and paper operations 
became the subject of scientific research and policy deliberations during the 
1950s, attention was initially directed towards biological oxygen demand 
(BOD), that is, the extent to which organic waste materials consumed 
oxygen during decomposition with the result that less was available to 
sustain fish habitat or for other natural requirements34. A snapshot for 1959-
1960 indicates that 120 million feet of wood, seventy per cent consisting 
of spruce and balsam, was cut on the Québec side of the watershed. The 
Ottawa River itself and the Gatineau River contributed 24 million cubic 
feet and 14 million cubic feet respectively. The consequences of newsprint 
production from one mill alone resulted in annual discharges to the Ottawa 
30. See Odette vinCent-doMey, “Industry and the World of Work”, in C. GaFField (ed.), 
supra, note 11, p. 257, at pages 260-276, for the evolution of the regional pulp and paper 
industry.
31. John H. dales, Hydroelectricity and Industrial Development. Québec 1898-1940, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 145-150.
32. Henry V. nelles, The Politics of Development. Forests, Mines & Hydroelectric 
Power in Ontario, 1849-1941, 2d ed., Montréal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005 ; 
Christopher arMstronG, The Politics of Federalism : Ontario’s Relations with the 
Federal Government, 1867-1942, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981.
33. Jamie BenidiCkson, The Culture of Flushing. A Social and Legal History of Sewage, 
Vancouver, UBC Press, 2007, p. 262-264.
34. ontario water resourCes CoMMission, Pulp and Paper Records, “The Industrial 
Waste Situation in Ontario”, Conference on Water Quality Management, RG 84-12, 
Ottawa, Archives of Ontario, 1961.
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of 7,000 tons of fibres and 20,000 tons of bark. On a daily basis one million 
gallons of sulphite liquor were being introduced to the waterway35.
Industrial waste management, including pulp and paper operations, 
proceeded slowly along the policy-making agenda, generally in the form of 
guidelines, and with the encouragement of such newly-formed agencies as 
the Ontario Water Resources Commission. Industry-wide approaches were 
encouraged and remedial measures were promoted, however, on the more 
or less explicit understanding that waste removal was an important natural 
function of waterways. Thus, having reported on a range of responses to 
water pollution, including the formation of a committee of mill operators 
in the Ottawa Valley, a senior industry representative firmly articulated 
his perspective :
It is common knowledge among those whose duty it is to control and protect our 
natural waters that some degree of waste disposal is inevitable if our present form 
of society is to continue…. Nor is this necessarily a bad thing. [L]arge bodies 
of natural waters such as we have in many parts of Canada — are capable of 
absorbing relatively large amounts of waste without harm. The proper use of this 
capacity of our natural waters is just as essential to the prosperity and develop-
ment of our country and our industry as the proper use of our forests, our land 
and our mineral deposits36.
A decade after this presentation, in 1971, high concentrations of 
suspended solids and related sludge deposition were reported downstream 
from the Kipawa mill of the Canadian International Paper Company in 
Temiscaming, the Hull mill of the E.B. Eddy Company, and the Cana-
dian International Paper Company mill at Gatineau. The Masson mill of 
the James MacLaren Company, the Thurso mill of the Thurso Pulp and 
Paper Company, the Hawkesbury mill of the Canadian International Paper 
Company, and the Consolidated Bathurst Company mill at Pontiac were 
responsible for lesser impacts37.
Pulp and paper had replaced lumbering as the primary source of pres-
sure on water quality along the Ottawa. Overall this sector was responsible 
35. Gustave prévost, “A Typical Drainage Basin : The Ottawa River”, in Resources for 
Tomorrow, Conference held in Montréal, 23-28 October 1961, supp. vol. “Background 
Papers”, Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 1962, p. 83, at pages 101-103.
36. W.H. palM, President, Hinde and Dauch, Address delivered at the Conference on 
Co-ordinated Pollution Control, RG84-12, TBE 193, Ottawa, Ontario Archives, 1960, 
p. 11.
37. ontario water resourCes CoMMission / quéBeC water Board, Ottawa River 
Basin. Water Quality and its Control in the Ottawa River, vol. 1, Toronto, Ontario 
Water Resources Commission, 1971, p. 5 [hereinafter “Ottawa River Basin”]. Mercury 
discharges from two mills contaminated fish populations and resulted in the closure of 
commercial fisheries downstream from the Chaudière dam in 1970.
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for discharging approximately 190 tons per day of suspended solids. Addi-
tional discharges of organic wastes substantially reduced oxygen levels 
in the river with a five day BOD of over 1 million pounds. The pulp and 
paper sector continued to champion the timber drive (e.g. the Gatineau) as 
a key component of its successful operation, for the river was “a tireless 
worker, […] 24 hours per day, seven days per week, suffers no mechanical 
breakdowns, conserves energy and causes no air pollution38”.
The pulp and paper sector was also a primary user of the hydroelectric 
power potential of the Ottawa Valley, again resulting in environmental 
impacts that fell outside the scope of contemporary regulatory oversight39.
2.2 Hydroelectric Power Production
The Booth, Bronson, and Eddy interests vigorously contested water 
power sites along the Ottawa from the late 19th century, eventually tran-
sitioning to hydroelectric power production. Prospects for hydro devel-
opment were encouraged40, but interprovincial agreements and storage 
facilities were eventually required to stabilize the framework for invest-
ment and production41. Some hydro dams such as Chats Falls and the 
Bryson generating station date from the interwar years, a period of signifi-
cant economic consolidation as the Gatineau Power Company, a subsid-
iary of International Paper, acquired numerous smaller operations along 
tributary waterways in the lower Ottawa valley. In the same era (particu-
larly between 1926 and 1931), Gatineau Power, pursuant to an agreement 
with the Québec Streams Commission, developed major reservoirs on the 
Gatineau River to enhance future hydro production42.
A further flurry of construction followed a 1943 agreement between 
Ontario and Québec to allocate undeveloped water power sites along the 
Ottawa River itself. This wave of activity included generating stations at 
Des Joachims (begun in 1946 and completed in 1950), Chenaux (begun in 
1948 and operational in 1951), and La Cave where the Otto Holden Dam 
was built between 1948 and 1952. The Carillon Generating Station came 
38. Nicolle Baird and GiGnaC, “Water in Action : Using Rivers for Work and Play”, Address 
delivered at the NCC Conference Presentation, 10 June 1987, p. 7 and 8 [unpublished 
manuscript in possession of the author].
39. These impacts include habitat destruction, flooding, siltation, and interference with 
seasonal flows and related natural functions.
40. Canada, departMent oF tHe interior, Water Powers of Canada. The Province of 
Ontario, by Henry G. aCres, Ottawa, Dominion Water Power Branch, 1915, p. 13 and 
14.
41. O. vinCent-doMey, supra, note 30, at page 267.
42. J. dales, supra, note 31, p. 146-148.
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into operation in 1964. Facilities of this nature, if they do not contribute 
directly to increased pollution loads on the river, substantially alter the 
river’s restorative capacity and habitat quality because of their impact on 
current, the deposition of suspended materials, and so on.
The potentially significant official initiative towards an integrated insti-
tutional perspective on the Ottawa watershed emerged from the desire for 
co-ordination within the hydroelectricity sector. However, references to 
integrated watershed management in the policies of the Ottawa River Regu-
lation Planning Board are essentially confined to the interests of hydro-
electric power producers in the major storage reservoirs of the basin43.
In addition to resource use and industrial activity along the Ottawa 
watershed, the development of settlements, urbanization and associated 
land uses resulted in significant ongoing environmental changes whose 
cumulative effects largely escaped regulatory review.
3 Urbanization
As they developed throughout the Ottawa Valley, numerous centres 
of population outgrew well-based water supply systems and turned to 
the Ottawa or tributary rivers. For Arnprior (1901), Hawkesbury (1903), 
Pembroke (1893), Hull (1885) and the national capital (1874), the Ottawa 
itself furnished municipal water for residential, commercial and fire-
fighting purposes. Gatineau Point (1901) and Gracefield (1911) drew on the 
Gatineau River, with other communities taking advantage of nearby surface 
sources : Carleton Place (1915, Mississippi) ; Renfrew (1897, Bonnechère) ; 
 Buckingham (1892, Lièvre). At approximately the same time, these commu-
nities introduced wastewater systems discharging household sewage and 
industrial waste back into the flow.
In the nation’s capital, a singularly unhealthy set of circumstances had 
arisen following the introduction of a piped municipal supply and sewerage 
during the 1870s. The bacteriological threat to water quality was not even 
understood however at the time this infrastructure was put in place.
In an extensive commissioned study, Allen Hazen assessed the Ottawa 
River as “in many respects a magnificent supply44” given its catchment area 
and storage capacity. Yet he firmly urged the city to install water treat-
ment facilities if supply was to be drawn from the River : sewage pollution, 
43. ottawa river reGulation planninG Board, [Online], [www.ottawariver.ca] (6 July 
2010).
44. ottawa City CounCil, Report Improvement of the Ottawa Water Supply, by Allen 
Hazen, Ottawa, 5 October 1910, p. 38.
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still limited in comparison with other rivers, “is already sufficient so that 
the water cannot be used in its raw state with confidence, and is steadily 
increasing45”. An alternative source, McGregor Lake in the Gatineau Hills, 
offered water “of excellent quality46”.
By 1913, another consultant’s report recommended that Ottawa 
should disregard the river and draw its water across the inter-jurisdic-
tional divide from sources in Québec’s Gatineau Hills47. Provincial and 
federal statutes were enacted to facilitate the project, including provin-
cial legislation providing service to Hull and other Québec municipalities 
if Ottawa chose to tap Gatineau Hills sources48. One Ottawa municipal 
council eagerly passed a by-law to fund the new water-works, but irate 
ratepayers succeeded in having that by-law quashed49. Clearly, even after 
bacteriological discoveries in the late nineteenth century, recognition of 
the linkage between health and contaminated water supplies was slow in 
coming50. In 1914, Ottawa re-affirmed a preference for water drawn from 
the Ottawa River51 — and filtered locally, over the more costly scheme to 
deliver uncontaminated water from Québec. Ontario’s Provincial Board of 
Health unanimously rejected the city’s choice, observing that the Ottawa 
River was “beyond any question, a polluted source of supply at all points 
in the vicinity of the city of Ottawa52”. Accordingly, the board concluded 
that it would not be consistent with its duty to the citizens of Ottawa or 
to visitors to the national capital to “countenance the use of water which, 
after mechanical filtration, constantly requires chlorination, when a pure 
and adequate supply, requiring no treatment whatever, may be readily 
procured53”. A re-assessment of Ottawa’s water volume requirements for 
fire fighting purposes eventually removed the Gatineau lakes plan from 
contention54.
Meanwhile, the distinguished francophone Senator Napoleon Belcourt 
advocated renewed national action against water pollution. The successful 
45. Id., p. 39.
46. Id., p. 18.
47. Binnie and Houston, Consultants’ report, referred to in Ottawa (City) v. Ontario 
(Provincial Board of Health) (1914), 33 O.L.R. 1, 4 (Ont. S.C.).
48. Ottawa Waterworks Act, S.Q. 1914, c. 81.
49. Re Clarey v. City of Ottawa (1913), 25 O.W.R. 340 (H.C.J.), 5 O.W.N. 370.
50. John H. taylor, “Fire, Disease and Water in Ottawa : An Introduction”, Urban History 
Review, vol. 8, No. 1, June 1979, p. 7.
51. Ottawa (City) v. Ontario (Provincial Board of Health), supra, note 47.
52. Id., 7.
53. Id., 8.
54. Chris warFe, “The Search for Pure Water in Ottawa : 1910-1915”, Urban History Review, 
vol. 8, No. 1, June 1979, p. 90.
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earlier ban on sawdust, he suggested as early as 1910, might usefully be 
supplemented by a further prohibition. Invoking typhoid deaths in Ottawa 
and elsewhere, he called on parliament to declare that “our noble rivers 
shall no longer be made the receptacles of the raw sewage of the country55”. 
In 1911, Senator Belcourt re-introduced legislation to implement a prohibi-
tion against contaminating navigable water in Canada. Directed at surface 
waters generally, the proposed protections were wider in scope than most 
provincial efforts to safeguard sources of water supply.
Belcourt’s efforts were intermittently connected with the work of 
Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier’s national Commission of Conserva-
tion. Thus, at the Commission’s 1910 Ottawa conference, the engineer 
T. Aird Murray vigorously promoted national legislative action, arguing 
that provincial authorities were incapable of safeguarding transboundary 
watersheds like the Ottawa : “For example the province of Ontario may 
have the most stringent laws relative to water pollution, and after putting 
its house in order would be yet dependent upon the action taken by the 
province of Québec relative to the pollution of the Ottawa river whose 
banks are interprovincial56.”
As a professional, Murray advocated the treatment of sewage, although 
he acknowledged that “[l]egislation on public health matters, unless under-
stood and conceded by citizens to meet a public want, is of little or no 
avail57.” Alas, Ottawa River communities, like the vast majority of their 
North American counterparts, chose to rely on the chemical treatment of 
water supplies — chiefly by means of chlorination — rather than sewage 
treatment to enhance the quality of municipal water. The strategy subor-
dinated general environmental conditions in favour of an exclusive focus 
on public health. 
A widespread preference for water treatment over sewage treatment, 
together with the economic constraints of the depression and wartime 
delayed development of water protection facilities. As concern mounted 
following World War II, successive investigations identified areas experi-
encing “water quality impairment” in a sixty mile stretch downstream from 
55. Canada, Senate Debates, 2nd sess., 14th Parl., 2 March 1910, “Protection des eaux 
navigables. Bill. Deuxième lecture”, p. 349 (Napoleon Belcourt).
56. CoMMission oF Conservation, CoMMittee on puBliC HealtH, The Prevention of the 
Pollution of Canadian Surface Waters, by T. Aird Murray, Ottawa, Lowe-Martin, 1912, 
p. 7.
57. Id., p. 23 and 24.
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Temiscaming to Deux Rivières and in the eighty mile section of the river 
from Ottawa-Hull down to the Lake of Two Mountains58. 
Not until 1963 did Ottawa’s Green’s Creek sewage treatment facility 
commence operations, even then offering only primary treatment. By 
the time of a comprehensive watershed survey later in the decade, a few 
communities on the Ontario side, (not including the nation’s capital,) had 
introduced secondary treatment. Québec communities, including Hull, 
Gatineau and Pointe Gatineau, generally disregarded sewage treatment 
in this era59. Instead, in conjunction with the formation of the National 
Capital Commission in the 1950s, an interceptor sewer proposal for Québec 
communities encompassed within the proposed “Greenbelt” was formu-
lated in 1949 and finally agreed to in 195860.
As the twentieth century closed, the Ottawa River was the second 
largest overall recipient of sewage discharge in Ontario with 9 percent of 
total provincial discharges from sewage treatment plants. On a national 
basis, Ottawa-Carleton’s STP was second only to Toronto’s Ashbridge’s 
Bay facility as a source of ammonia releases to water61. This disheart-
ening record was established several years before notorious mishaps that 
saw vast quantities of untreated sewage pour into the river. About 764 
million litres were discharged in August 2006, and not reported to provin-
cial officials, resulting in significant municipal liability and extended inter-
governmental effort to restore river quality62. Operational problems have 
58. The principal reports include quéBeC anti-pollution leaGue, Rapport sur la pollution 
de la rivière Ottawa et de ses principaux tributaires entre Ottawa-Hull et l’île de Montréal 
en 1954, by Lucien piCHé, Montréal, Fédération des Associations de chasse et de pêche 
du Québec, Association de la province de Québec pour la protection du poisson et du 
gibier, 1954 ; ontario departMent oF HealtH, Report on Ottawa River and Tributaries, 
1956 and quéBeC water Board, Rapport sur l’État des Eaux de la Rivière Outaouais, 
1965. These are summarized in the Ottawa River Basin, supra, note 37, p. 84.
59. Id., p. 27-31.
60. C.J. Bond, “Degradation of the Ottawa River”, in pollution proBe, Proceedings of 
the Ottawa River Conference, held at Carleton University, 12-13 June 1970, Ottawa, 
Pollution Probe, 1971, p. 7, at page 14.
61. environMental CoMMissioner oF ontario, 2002-2003 Annual Report. Thinking 
Beyond the Near and Now, Toronto, November 2003, p. 36, 38 and 41, [Online], [www.
eco.on.ca/eng/uploads/eng_pdfs/ar2002.pdf] (22 June 2010).
62. Dianne saxe, “ $450,000 Fine for City of Ottawa Sewage Spill”, Environmental Law and 
Litigation, 14 October 2008, [Online], [envirolaw.com/450000-fine-for-city-of-ottawa-
sewage-spill] (22 June 2010) ; Patrick dare, “O’Brien Seeks NCC’s Help to Clean up 
Ottawa River ; Mayor Asks Commission to Include Waterway on Inter-governmental 
Meeting”, Ottawa Citizen, 20 August 2008, p. D5 ; Patrick dare, “Baird Backs River 
Cleanup ; Minister Earmarks $9.3M for Upgrades to Sewer System”, Ottawa Citizen, 
13 June 2009, p. C5.
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persisted63, leading in 2010 to new commitments to address the systemic 
shortcomings and to alleviate the apprehension of neighbouring communi-
ties downstream64.
Land-based activity such as agriculture also has significant potential to 
undermine water quality as a consequence of the use of chemical pesticides 
and fertilizers, or as a result of the run-off of organic materials from live-
stock operations conducted in or near riparian zones. Smaller waterways, 
tributary to the Ottawa, with the South Nation as a prime example, have 
deteriorated dramatically from concentrated livestock activity that has 
resulted in particularly high nutrient loads, especially in combination with 
effluent outflows from small scale sewage treatment facilities and lagoons. 
The challenges along this particular waterway are longstanding65.
The proliferation of residential sub-divisions, golf courses and other 
activities along the Ottawa or tributary waterways have also posed threats 
and challenges, both from the perspective of water quality within the river 
and to the birds and other wildlife that would otherwise frequent the banks 
and wetlands. These are all contributors to the industrial and urban trans-
formation of the overall river system although they are ordinarily addressed 
in isolation within the legal system. 
4 The Emergence of the Watershed Framework
Intermittent litigation and periodic episodes of prosecutorial effort to 
forestall degradation of the Ottawa River in the late nineteenth century 
were succeeded by a more sustained program of public health inspections. 
These efforts were then supplemented by numerous public inquiries into 
the condition of the waterway dating from the mid-twentieth century, albeit 
with limited results from a law reform perspective.
While finding conditions generally quite good, a 1947 report on the 
Ottawa River Drainage Basin, one of Canada’s “industrial waters,” empha-
sized that this situation would continue “only if deforestation and pollu-
tion of the watershed is prevented and if means are taken to protect the 
63. Patrick dare, “System Foul-up Sees Raw Sewage Dumped into Ottawa River”, Ottawa 
Citizen, 1 August 2009, p. C1.
64. ottawa river aCtion plan, [Online], [www.ottawa.ca/residents/waterwaste/river_
action/index_en.html] (22 June 2010).
65. ontario, tHe walkerton inquiry, Water Supply and Sewage Infrastructure in Ontario, 
1880-1990s : Legal and Institutional Aspects of Public Health and Environmental History, 
by Jamie BenidiCkson, Commissioned Paper No. 1, Toronto, Queen’s Printer for 
Ontario, 2002, p. 60, [Online], [ozone.scholarsportal.info/bitstream/1873/7663/1/10294043.
pdf] (22 June 2010).
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quality of the water as population and industrial activity within the area 
increases”. At the time of the survey, “waste disposal to the river appears 
to be counter-balanced in many cases by the adequate flow of a relatively 
pure water from heavily wooded, sparsely populated areas66”. The inte-
gral relationship between water quality and land-based activity that had 
eluded Sir John A. Macdonald was on the radar screen — barely — and even 
bolstered with a call for prevention and protection rather than remediation.
By 1961, however, the Chair of Québec’s Water Purification Board 
expressed profound apprehension. “Are we going to let the water dete-
riorate to a point where the Ottawa River cannot be approached safely ?” 
asked Guy Prévost, much as T. Aird Murray had asked in the context of 
the Commission of Conservation investigations half a century before67. 
Pursuant to an announcement by the Premiers of Québec and Ontario in 
August 1967, the Ontario Water Resources Commission and the Québec 
Water Board collaborated in a 1971 study of threats to water quality : “The 
severe pollution pressures that result from the discharge of inadequately 
treated municipal and industrial wastes presently threaten to destroy the 
water quality of the Ottawa River if permitted to continue68.”
The 1971 joint Ontario-Québec study advanced several noteworthy 
recommendations. It urged, in particular, that “responsibility for demon-
strating that a waste effluent is harmless to water uses in the concentrations 
to be found in the receiving water rests with those producing the discharge”, 
and called for all wastes to receive “best practicable treatment or control 
consistent with the water quality standards69”.
Numerous individual initiatives and decisions along these and related 
lines have subsequently been observed within the watershed. For example, 
an important decision on the allocation of financial liability for cleaning up 
environmental damage arose in connection with the legacy of a regional 
woolen mill, the Appletex facility, and its storage ponds70. And, along the 
66. J.F. tHoMas, “Ottawa River Drainage Basin”, in Water Survey Report No. 2, Canada 
Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, Ottawa, 1947-1948, p. 7.
67. G. prévost, supra, note 35, at page 90.
68. Ottawa River Basin, supra, note 37, p. 20.
69. Id., p. 7.
70. Ontario (Ministry of Environment and Energy, Southern Region) v. 724597 Ontario Inc. 
(1995), 18 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 137 (Ont. Ct. of J. (Gen. Div.)) (leave to appeal refused, Ont. 
C.A., 11-03-1996, M17227).
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South Nation River a water quality trading experiment seeks to encourage 
economically efficient water quality protection measures71.
“Sound ecological principles” in the formulation of water quality 
standards were also proposed by the 1971 joint Ontario-Québec study, at 
approximately the same time that one well-placed observer offered a frank 
assessment of obstacles confronting anyone who set out to safeguard the 
Ottawa River : “Costs, jurisdictional problems and divisions of power are 
[…] but secondary considerations — the by-products of our social attitudes. 
In this whole question of pollution we are dealing with a cultural phenom-
enon. We have the technology and the wealth to at least make a good start 
on beating pollution. But we have no collective commitment72.”
The lack of collective agreement on the Ottawa basin was underscored, 
ironically, by legislation from this era that appeared to embrace opportuni-
ties for watershed management. The Canada Water Act offered potential 
to address water quality on a basin-wide level. The overall results however 
were largely confined to reporting conditions rather than to remedying 
deterioration, with no discernable reference to the Ottawa73.
Additional opportunities to promote a more ecological and basin-based 
approach to the Ottawa watershed have also emerged from provincial 
initiatives and citizen-led organizations. Since 2002, Québec has encour-
aged watershed or basin-wide planning with citizen participation74, and at 
least the Lièvre and the Gatineau are moving in this direction75. Roughly 
comparable developments are underway in Ontario in connection with 
drinking water source protection measures introduced after the Walkerton 
tragedy76. At approximately the same time, concerned citizens formalized 
71. Ian CaMpBell, “Toward a National Freshwater Policy Framework”, Horizons. Policy 
Research Initiative, vol. 9, No. 1, May 2006, p. 4, at page 7 ; Dennis o’Grady and Mary 
Ann wilson, “Phosphorus Trading in the South Nation River Watershed, Ontario, 
Canada”, 1999, [Online], [www.envtn.org/uploads/ontario.PDF] (23 June 2010).
72. W.T. perks, “Cultural Barriers to Pollution Abatement”, in pollution proBe, supra, 
note 60, p. 83, at page 84.
73. Canada Water Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-11, Parts I and II ; Peter H. pearse and Frank 
quinn, “Recent Developments in Federal Water Policy : One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back”, Canadian Water Resources Journal, vol. 21, No. 4, Winter 1996, p. 329.
74. Catherine CHoquette and Alain létourneau (eds.), Vers une gouvernance de l’eau 
au Québec, Québec, Éditions MultiMondes, 2008. Current proposals by the Economic 
Institute of Montréal for the export of water from Québec involve increased power 
production in the upper Ottawa River.
75. CoMité du Bassin versant de la rivière du lièvre, Protéger l’eau pour la vie !, 
[Online], [www.cobali.org] (22 June 2010) ; aGenCe Bassin versant des 7, [Online], 
[www.comga.org] (22 June 2010).
76. Clean Water Act, S.O. 2006, c. 22.
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the creation of the Ottawa Riverkeeper, the third Canadian participant 
in the international Waterkeeper Alliance77. A further valiant initiative 
seeking to promote public awareness and to transcend inter-jurisdictional 
boundaries on the basis of consolidated information and data bases is 
the Ottawa Gatineau Watershed Atlas, launched in 200978. And, although 
remedial authority is not associated with designation under the Canadian 
Heritage River system, proponents of a designation for the Ottawa River 
specifically cite a clean environment and healthy ecosystems as direct 
benefits79.
The ultimate objective, watershed-based ecological governance, 
remains challenging but not unattainable even along heavily-utilized 
 inter-jurisdictional basins such as the Ottawa.
77. ottawa riverkeeper, [Online], [www.ottawariverkeeper.ca] (22 June 2010).
78. ottawa-Gatineau watersHed atlas, [Online], [www.ogwa-hydrog.ca] (22 June 2010).
79. ottawa river HeritaGe desiGnation CoMMittee, A Background Study for Nomination 
of the Ottawa River Under the Canadian Heritage Rivers System, QLF Canada, 2005, 
Section 6.2.1, p. 241, [Online], [ottawariver.org/html/news/whatsnew_e.html] (23 June 
2010).
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